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Abstract 
Standard neoclassical principal-agent theory predicts that stricter monitoring should reduce employee shirking 
from principal desires; however, recent analyses indicate that social aspects of principal-agent relationships 
may result in monitoring “crowding out” disciplinary effects.  From 2001 to 2008 Major League Baseball 
(MLB) instituted an automated pitch-tracking system (QuesTec) to assist in monitoring its umpires.  The 
asymmetric implementation of this new monitoring technology allows for the comparison of monitored and 
unmonitored umpires to identify shirking to placate on-field lobbying pressure.  Estimates identify deviations 
in calls associated with monitoring; however, overall, umpires appeared to be quite sensitive to league 
directives for changes in the strike zone absent technological monitoring.  Thus, while additional monitoring 
had some effect on umpire behavior, the extreme sensitivity to MLB mandates when unmonitored by the 
new technology indicates that pre-existing monitoring (which included human oversight and efficiency wages) 
was effective at limiting shirking by umpires.   
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I try to call the game I would normally call, but I think about QuesTec every once in a while.  
– Anonymous umpire (Chass, 2003) 
1. Introduction 
Interests of principals and agents are rarely in perfect alignment; therefore, it is expected that agents may take 
actions that are not in the best interest of the principal (Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Jensen and Meckling 
1976).  In response, principals monitor agents by actively identifying and punishing shirking and/or 
employing incentive mechanisms to encourage conformity with the principal’s interest (e.g., performance 
bonuses, profit-sharing, efficiency wages, etc.).  The necessity of principal-agent relationships in economic 
activity requires determination of optimal monitoring to balance adherence to principal interests and 
tolerance of agent shirking. 
Recent technological advances provide new means to monitor employees by directly observing and recording 
specific instances of shirking.  Standard principal-agent theory predicts that additional monitoring should 
reduce agent shirking from principal desires; however, several recent theoretical and empirical studies indicate 
that monitoring may not have the desired effect.  Monitoring can generate distrust among agents that 
dampens and “crowds out” the shirking deterrence effects of monitoring desired by principals (Frey 1993, 
Ellingsen and Johannesson 2008, Falk and Kosfeld 2008, Nagin et al. 2002).  Furthermore, the returns to 
monitoring are diminishing, so that additional oversight may confer little further benefits beyond existing 
monitoring.  
This analysis uses a new testing ground to examine the sensitivity of employee agents to principal monitoring, 
where principal-agent preferences and incentives are known and outcomes are easily observed in a controlled 
setting.  Goff and Tollison (1990) suggest sports can serve as a useful economics laboratory for studying 
human behavior.  Sports are ideal for testing economic hypotheses because the relevant variables can be 
measured with accuracy, which allows for controlled experiments; the number of observations are large; 
incentives are well defined; and the data are applicable to a wide variety of economic phenomena.1  
In this study, I use data from Major League Baseball (MLB) regular season games to examine umpire 
behavior in response to a new monitoring technology.  Umpires are highly-trained and experienced experts in 
applying baseball rules, and thus their performance is difficult to evaluate by a less-knowledgeable principal, 
resulting in moral hazard.  Changes in umpire calls in response to league directives, in light of incentives to 
shirk, should illuminate our understanding of agent sensitivity to principal mandates as well as the 
effectiveness of monitoring technology.   
Umpires are assigned the task of determining whether a pitch is a ball or a strike based on a rule-book-
defined strike zone.  Calls are made in real time and are not subject to reversal.  Umpires are regularly 
reviewed by a team of supervisors and may be rewarded with perks, such as participation in post-season 
games; however, umpires are rarely disciplined or fired for poor performance and turnover rates are low.2  
Though umpires have incentives to serve their chief principal, their incentives are not perfectly aligned with 
MLB’s interests.  Umpires face daily scrutiny from players, managers, and fans (directly and through the 
media).  Because baseball is a zero-sum game, pressure from competing factions of interest groups, umpires 
routinely face lobbying from aggrieved parties.  Due to these close and repeat relationships with these parties, 
umpires likely wish to minimize conflict with effective lobbying constituencies to avoid ex post 
                                                     
1 A prime example of this approach is demonstrated in McCormick and Tollison (1984) and Hutchinson and Yates 
(2007), which apply an economic model of crime to basketball to examine the behavioral response to increased police 
presence using the exogenous addition of an extra referee. 
2 DiGiovanna, (2011) reports, “Not one of baseball's 68 major league umpires has been fired in the last 10 years because 
of poor ratings behind the plate.”  O’Connell (2007) notes that, on average, there is one umpire opening per year.   
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disapprobation.  If oversight slack is sufficient to permit umpire discretion, then effective lobbying by players 
or a vocal crowd may persuade umpires to shirk and affect marginal calls.  Buraimo, Forrest, and Simmoms 
(2010) and Buraimo, Simmons, and Maciaszczyk (2012) have identified lobbying effects generating home-
team bias by referees in European soccer.  The authors note the importance of controlling for in-game 
incentives for separating bias from strategic considerations that are important at the time calls are issued that 
are not discernable in aggregate data; thus, they use minute-by-minute observations to assess potential 
favoritism.  The isolated contests between individual hitters and pitchers in baseball allows for the 
consideration of additional lobbying effects from player constituencies, as well. 
Prior to 2001, umpires were reviewed only through personal subjective observations, and thus there was no 
mechanism for objective feedback for performance evaluation.  In an effort to better monitor umpires, MLB 
installed the QuesTec computer imaging system in eleven parks over eight years from 2001 to 2008.  This 
new monitoring technology provided objective oversight of umpire performance and thus may have served as 
an effective deterrent to umpires with incentives to shirk to meet lobbying pressure.  Economists have 
previously used QuesTec to examine the impact of monitoring on umpire behavior.  Bradbury (2007) uses 
outcomes inside and outside QuesTec parks to measure the effects of managerial lobbying for calls, finding 
scant evidence of managerial influence on strikeouts and walks.  Parsons et al. (2011) tests QuesTec 
monitoring as a deterrent of racial discrimination in umpire calls and finds QuesTec parks to be associated 
with reduced racial bias in ball/strike calls; however, Tainsky et al. (2015) demonstrates that the findings are 
sensitive to data and specification choices.  Mills (forthcoming A) compares overall differences in total- and 
called strike rates of individual umpires, using QuesTec implementation and other factors, to examine the role 
of monitoring and feedback on umpire performance, finding some impact of monitoring and improvement 
over time.  
This analysis uses QuesTec to analyze umpire responsiveness to examine agent responsiveness to new 
monitoring technology.  The empirical strategy of using plate-appearance-level data permits controlling for 
immediate relevant factors that may affect umpire calls, such as home field advantage, game situation, player 
abilities, and lobbying influences.  Empirical estimates indicate that QuesTec monitoring reduced called 
strikes, and that umpires were more sensitive to pitcher rather than batter interests.  Though the effects are 
statistically significant, they are small.  Relative to the strong observed response of umpires to the MLB 
directive to increase called strikes in all parks, umpires appeared to be quite responsive to the principal and 
thus the identified shirking is minimal.  Overall, the play of the game on the field was not significantly 
different inside and outside QuesTec parks; however, QuesTec was associated with shorter games and fewer 
pitches thrown.  Thus, even though additional objective monitoring reduced shirking, existing monitoring, 
sanctions, training, and compensation were highly effective at influencing umpire behavior.   
 
2. MLB Umpire Monitoring 
The game of baseball requires the use of umpires to adjudicate plays on the field in real time.  Each play 
begins with the pitcher pitching the ball to the batter, who may choose to swing at the pitch or let it pass.  
For pitches at which the batter does not swing, the umpire is responsible for declaring the pitch to be a strike 
or a ball.  The strikes and balls accumulate during the plate appearance, with three strikes resulting in an out 
and four balls resulting in a safe advance of the batter to first base.  Baseball is a zero-sum game in which outs 
benefit the pitching team and are a cost to the batting team.  Thus, on pitches where a batter does not swing, 
the umpire plays a crucial role in determining the outcome of the game.  Pitchers and batters respond to the 
enforced strike zone as it is called by the umpire, with pitchers placing the ball strategically around the called 
strike zone and batters responding congruently. 
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The strike zone is defined de jure to be the ball crossing over home plate horizontally, which is 17 inches wide, 
and vertically between the knees and mid-torso of the batter.  While the horizontal strike-zone is objectively 
defined the same for all batters, the vertical strike-zone varies from batter to batter, and has been adjusted 
(officially and unofficially) over time.  Regardless of the objective definition, the strike zone is open to the 
interpretation of the umpire, particularly for pitches on the edge of the strike zone.   
The umpire is assigned to be a neutral arbitrator of balls and strikes, but he is open to influence from several 
interested parties.  Batters desire balls; pitchers desire strikes; teammates, managers, and team-specific fans 
want balls for their batters and strikes for their pitchers; and League officials want balls and strikes to be 
called correctly and fairly in accordance with MLB directives.  Due to their proximity, pitchers and batters can 
lobby umpires directly on the field.  Managers also have an opportunity to lobby for their players on the field; 
however, their interest is team-specific and therefore a manager’s interest is not fully in-line with his players.  
For example, a manager with a weak pitcher may lobby for a bigger strike zone that would benefit his pitchers 
but be a detriment to his batters.  Home team fans may also lobby through praise and punishment by 
cheering or booing unfavorable calls, while visiting team fans normally lack an effective means for in-game 
lobbying resulting in an asymmetry of influence between teams.  Home team advantage through lobbying of 
officials is well-documented in baseball and other sports (Moskowitz and Wertheim, 2011).  
For much of baseball history, League officials were limited to monitoring umpires through personal 
observation; however, technological advances in ball-tracking have led to several different types of 
monitoring technology to identify pitch-placement relative to the strike zone.  MLB’s strike zone definition 
was last changed officially in 1996, when the base of the strike zone was extended from the top of a batter’s 
knees to bottom of his knees.  Though the strike zone definition has not changed since that time, its 
enforcement has.  As part of an effort to enforce the stated rule-book definition of the strike zone, in 2001 
MLB instructed umpires to change the de facto strike zone as it was being called by umpires.  The changes 
involved shrinking the typically-called strike zone horizontally and expanding the zone upward approximately 
seven inches (Chass, 2001b).  In conjunction with this rule-enforcement change, MLB introduced the 
QuesTec monitoring system in three parks in 2001.  The camera-based system was expanded to eight parks in 
2002, ten parks in 2003, and eleven parks in 2006.3   
In 2003, the World Umpire Association union filed a grievance, which was later dropped, regarding the use of 
QuesTec.  Umpires felt the monitoring was unfair and claimed that it altered their calls, changing their strike 
zones from park to park.  They asserted that they were told that if more than 90 percent of their calls did not 
conform to the QuesTec strike zone they would be classified as providing below-standard umpiring (Chass 
2003).  Thus, there is anecdotal evidence that umpires felt pressure to adjust their ball/strike calls in response 
to QuesTec monitoring from what their preferred strike zone would be.  The overt objection to monitoring 
may not solely represent a desire to shirk.  Frey (1993) argues that increased monitoring may signal principal 
distrust of the agents.  Umpires may have been offended that MLB did not trust their expert judgement and 
thus altered their calls as an act of defiance. 
In 2007, the PITCHf/x tacking system was implemented for use by MLB’s online game-tracking website, 
which provided public access to pitch-tracking data.  Though PITCHf/x was not explicitly used for 
evaluating umpires, it allowed fans an objective tool for umpire evaluation—something that was not available 
from QuesTec’s privately held data.  Fans, media members, and participants could access this data for ex post 
lobbying purposes.  Participants could also observe ball/strike calls and adjust their expectations about the 
                                                     
3 It is worth noting that there are conflicting media reports regarding the number of QuesTec parks and times of 
installation.  I assigned QuesTec designations based on the most credible and consistent documentation available from 
multiple sources. QuesTec installation by year: 2001 – Arizona, Boston, and New York Mets; 2002 – Anaheim, 
Cleveland, Houston, Milwaukee, and Tampa Bay; 2003 – New York Yankees and Oakland; 2006 – Chicago White Sox.  
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strike zone.  In 2009, MLB abandoned QuesTec monitoring and replaced it with the Zone Evaluation system 
that was installed in all 30 MLB parks, which continues to operate in conjunction with Zone Evaluation.  
Since this time, objective umpire monitoring has been applied universally across all games, and thus the 
opportunity to examine cross-sectionals differences in monitoring across parks no longer exists. 
 
3. Estimating the Impact of Umpire Monitoring 
Play-by-play data from 2000 to 2009 are available from Retrosheet (2016) event files.  Play-by-play level data 
permits controlling for specific game situations, such as the base-out situation and quality of the players, that 
may affect pitch selection and umpire calls.4  The econometric model is represented in Equation 1. 
(1) Pi = μMi + χCi+ ψQii + γGSi + τTi + υUi + φBi + α + εi 
P is the proportion of called pitches that are declared strikes by the home plate umpire, the proportion of all 
pitches that resulted in swings by the batter, or the total number of pitches thrown during plate appearance i.  
A proportion is used because the called-pitch duration of each plate appearances is not fixed.  It is expected 
that pitchers and batters will adapt rationally to the umpire’s strike zone, and thus pitch or swing at pitches 
strategically according to the anticipated called zone for each observation.  For the former two estimates, I 
estimate Equation 1 using a generalized linear model that employs a binomial distribution and logit link 
function, because P is a percentage, bound between zero and one.  However, alternate Tobit and Poisson 
estimators of the dependent variable as a count were estimated and produced similar results.  Total pitches 
are estimated using a Poisson estimator.  Only plate appearances in which the game state remained the same 
for the duration of the appearance are included—for example, plate appearances that experience advances or 
outs on the bases (e.g. stolen bases or caught stealing) during the pitcher-batter contest are removed.  Plate 
appearances that result in intentional walks are also removed, because they do not involve umpire discretion.  
In order to ensure that seasonal averages used as control variables approximate batter and pitcher abilities, 
observations are limited to plate appearances where both the batter and pitcher experienced at least 100 plate 
appearances or batters faced during the season of analysis. 
M is a vector of three monitoring indicator variables: whether or not a park is monitored by the QuesTec, 
PITCHf/x, or Zone Evaluation monitoring systems.  QuesTec varies by park and year, while PITCHf/x and 
Zone Evaluation monitoring were adopted league-wide, half-way through the 2007 season (which I denote by 
the All-Star break) for the former and in 2009 for the latter.  Because QuesTec differs across parks, it is the 
primary focus of this analysis.  Outcome changes associated with PITCHf/x and Zone Evaluation may be 
attributable to other unique factors associated with these time periods.  Thus, the timeframe of this study 
evaluates every park for at least one season before and after the implementation of QuesTec.     
C is a vector of potential crowd effects on umpires.  Larger crowds may provide additional monitoring and 
proxy fan interest in the game; therefore, I include attendance as an explanatory variable.  A home team 
indicator variable denotes that the batter represents the home team and the pitcher represents the visiting 
team.  Home team bias will benefit the batters of the home team and harm the pitchers of the visiting team.  I 
also include an interaction term, the product of home team batting and attendance, to measure the impact of 
the additional home team pressure on the umpire. 
Q is a vector of player quality variables that are likely to influence the outcome of the plate appearances.  I 
include the average performance in the dependent variable for the batter and pitcher during the season—
                                                     
4 Data freely available at http://retrosheet.org. As a condition of use, I include the following statement: The information 
used here was obtained free of charge from and is copyrighted by Retrosheet.  Interested parties may contact Retrosheet 
at 20 Sunset Rd., Newark, DE 19711.  
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mean called strikes, swings, and pitches per plate appearance/batter faced—with the expectation that yearly 
outcomes are associated the plate appearance outcome.  I also include the playing experiences of the batter 
and the pitcher, measured by the number of years since the players’ major-league debuts.  This may contain 
some information regarding the players’ ability to manage the strike zone gained with experience—and thus 
impact a batter’s decision to swing or how close to the edge of the zone a pitcher may place his pitches—
however, this impact should be captured by average annual performance.  More important for this analysis, 
playing experience proxies the ability of players to earn respect or lobby umpires that results in favorable calls.  
If this influence matters, then pitchers (batters) with longer tenures are expected to experience more (fewer) 
called strikes.5  I also include an indicator variable if the batter and pitcher are opposite-handed.  Opposite-
handed interactions provide a “platoon” advantage to the batter.6  Mills (2014) finds that umpires are less 
likely to call a pitch a strike for catchers than non-catchers, because of their close proximity during the game; 
therefore, I include a catcher indicator variable denoting whether or not the batter plays the position of 
catcher for the team during the game. 
GS is a vector of game-state variables that includes indicator variables for inning (i.e., first through ninth, and 
one extra-inning indicator variable), runner configurations (e.g., runner on first, runners on first and second, 
etc.), and outs.  I also include the absolute difference in score at the start of the plate appearance.  These 
factors control for strategic considerations of the batter and pitcher during the plate appearance, as well as the 
umpire’s tendency to call balls and strikes in these situations.  
T is a vector of year effects which capture changes in the playing environment for that season, excluding the 
2000 season.  The Zone Evaluation indicator variable serves as the year effect for 2009.  U is a vector of 
unique home-plate umpire identifiers to control for individual umpire tendencies in calling balls and strikes.  
B is a vector of ballpark effects to capture unique aspects of home parks in influencing performance.  
Bradbury (2007) finds little effect of managerial influence on umpires, and preliminary estimates that 
employed manager indicator variables also indicated little managerial impact; therefore, manager indicators 
were not included in the final estimates.  α is a constant term and ε is an error term, with all errors clustered 
to each specific umpire.  Greek symbols preceding variable vectors denote appropriate vectors of coefficients. 
Table 1 reports the estimated effects of the variables in vectors M, C, and Q on the proportion of called 
strikes, called balls, and batter swings, and Table A.1 in the appendix reports the summary statistics for these 
variables.  To ease the interpretation of the estimates, the effects are reported as elasticities calculated at the 
sample average for continuous variables and as marginal effects for indicator variables.  
Plate appearances in QuesTec parks were associated fewer called strikes, and thus more called balls, indicating 
that pitchers were net-losers from QuesTec.  If batters were receiving more favorable calls with additional 
monitoring, then it may be expected that they would swing less often at pitches; however, this is not the case, 
because the rate at which batters swung at all pitches was not significantly less in QuesTec parks.  QuesTec 
was also associated with fewer pitches being thrown by approximately 0.016 fewer pitches per plate 
appearance.   
Thus, the estimates indicate that outside of QuesTec parks, where umpires were less monitored, umpires gave 
more marginal calls to pitchers.  This is not surprising, given that some of the most vocal complaints 
regarding QuesTec were made by pitchers.7  Pitchers also have a more concentrated interest group than 
                                                     
5 Player performance and experience characteristics were collected from Lahman (2016). 
6 Bradbury and Drinen (2008) finds support for the platoon effect and that batter-pitcher contests are independent and 
not meaningfully affected by teammate spillovers. 
7 For example, in 2003, Arizona pitcher Curt Schilling destroyed a QuesTec camera with a bat after a game in which he 
thought the system was influencing calls against him.  Pitcher Tom Glavine also expressed concern that umpires were 
narrowing their strike zones in QuesTec parks (Chass, 2003).  
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batters and suffer more individually from a poor umpire in a game.  The starting pitcher, who typically pitches 
most of the pitches for his team during a game, has sustained repeat interactions with the home plate umpire 
on defense.  Relief pitchers also typically face several batters per game.  On offense, batting opportunities are 
dispersed among eight or more batters.  An umpire who upsets a batter will have less opportunity for 
feedback than a pitcher over a course of a game.  Also, pitchers have more at stake from each game with an 
umpire, because an umpire who is missing calls affects a batter around four times per game, while a starting 
pitcher can expect to have twenty or more interactions during the game.  Pitchers have a greater incentive to 
lobby umpires than batters, because a game with unfavorable calls will have a greater weight on aggregate 
seasonal performance statistics—used in arbitration and free agent contract negotiations—for pitchers than it 
will for batters.  Therefore, shirking in the direction that benefits pitchers is not surprising.  
 
Table 1. Estimated Impact of Monitoring on Batting Outcomes 
  
The introduction of PITCHf/x was also associated with fewer strike calls, but batters were more likely to 
swing at pitches.  Zone Evaluation was not associated with the called strike or swing rates, but Zone 
Evaluation resulted in more pitches being thrown.  However, the coefficients of the PITCHf/x and Zone 
Evaluation variables should be interpreted with caution.  These monitoring systems were implemented 
Called Strike Swing Pitches
QuesTec -0.0025168* -0.0001676 -0.0162808*
[0.0012029] [0.0008921] [0.0067763]
PITCHf/x -0.0084042** 0.0069358** 0.0185955
[0.0017275] [0.0014883] [0.0102528]
Zone Evaluation 0.0040996 -0.0140204 0.0530349**
[0.0028759] [0.0020398] [0.0144869]
Home Team Batter -0.007164** -0.0076385** 0.0544672**
[0.001711] [0.001181] [0.0091524]
Attendance 0.0017388 -0.0019459 0.0126626**
[0.0040928] [0.0018008] [0.0019415]
Home Team Batter * Attendance 0.0050971* 0.0029555* -0.0055736**
[0.0023738] [0.0010568] [0.001127]
Batter Performance Rate 0.6970562** 0.897872** -0.054728**
[0.0055458] [0.0038676] [0.0054094]
Pitcher Performance Rate 0.7760705** 0.8289114** 0.0116748**
[0.0084913] [0.006513] [0.0005114]
Batter Experience -0.0224814** 0.0063417** 0.0012816
[0.001302] [0.0007161] [0.0006636]
Pitcher Experience 0.0046442** 0.0035825** -0.0074648**
[0.001302] [0.0007161] [0.0006636]
Platoon -0.0286244** -0.0020404** 0.0688172**
[0.000866] [0.0004078] [0.0033056]
Catcher Batting 0.0028032** 0.0046399** -0.0710761**
[0.0008478] [0.0006022] [0.004313]
Observations 1,323,427 1,606,351 1,606,351
** p <.01, * p<.05, standard errors clustered to individual umpires in brackets
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league-wide, and the lack of cross-section variation makes it difficult to distinguish effects attributable to the 
addition of these monitoring systems from other league-wide factors that are unrelated to monitoring.  
While the results do provide evidence of umpire shirking outside of QuesTec parks, the effect is small in two 
respects.  First, the direct magnitude of the effect is slight, resulting in less than one additional called strike 
per game (-0.81).  The large sample size used to generate the estimates make it likely that standard thresholds 
of statistical significance are expected even for small relationships.  However, the effect was large enough to 
elicit complaints from pitchers and umpires that were widely reported in the media.  Though the measured 
direct impact is small, the effect on the game is not limited to the direct impact on ball/strike calls.  Batter-
pitcher matchups are strategic and the parties respond to changing incentives by adjusting pitch location and 
swing decisions, which I address in Section 4.   
Second, though objective computer-image modeling was limited to QuesTec parks, the directive to call the 
strike zone in a manner more consistent with the rule-book strike zone was league-wide with the intention of 
increasing called strikes.8  Though the findings appear to reject the monitoring-deterrence hypothesis, 
umpires continued to be monitored by human crews who watched games in person and on television as had 
been done previously.  Thus, differences in QuesTec parks must be interpreted in the context of leaguewide 
changes in strike calls. 
Figure 1 maps the changes in the called strike rate by year for MLB.  It shows a dramatic increase in 2001, 
when MLB directed umpires to call a narrower and taller strike zone.  In this context, the 0.02 percentage-
point reduction in the called strikes in QuesTec parks is dwarfed by the mean 2.53 percentage-point increase 
in called strikes during the QuesTec era.  This reveals that though umpires were sensitive to QuesTec 
monitoring and decreased strike calls in QuesTec parks, they were also responsive to the League directive to 
call a strike zone in a way that made strikes more common both inside and outside QuesTec parks.  While the 
policy change favored pitchers overall, it was minimally dampened by QuesTec monitoring.  Thus, umpires 
may have shirked on the margin to benefit pitchers with less monitoring, but the total effect indicates strong 
sensitivity to the interests of their principal MLB that are far larger than the shirking identified.  The 
additional monitoring provided little further deterrence from shirking and may explain why MLB 
discontinued its use of QuesTec after 2008. 
Explanatory variables that proxy other interest group influences are largely consistent with expectations and 
are consistent with shirking on the margin.  Home team batters were less likely to receive strike calls, which is 
consistent with umpires contributing to home team bias.  The interaction term of attendance and home team 
batting is positive, indicating larger crowds reduced home team bias, possibly reflecting the role of visiting 
fans in the crowd or greater scrutiny associated with the game’s popularity.  More (less) experienced batters 
were less (more) likely to have pitches called strikes, and more (less) experienced pitchers were more (less) 
likely to have pitches called strikes, indicating umpire deference to veterans.  Contrary to Mills (2013), 
catchers were more likely to receive called strikes, which may be a response to the way catchers approach 
their plate appearances or reflect catchers lobbying for more called strikes for their pitchers.  However, the 
differing effect may be a product of the unit of analysis being each plate appearance rather than each pitch.  
Estimates for all these variables offer additional evidence of shirking; however, as it was for QuesTec, the 
estimated impacts are small.  The only large estimated effects are the annual batter and pitcher performances, 
which is consistent with umpires making correct calls.  The platoon advantage is negatively related to the 
called strike and swing rates, which is consistent with umpires correctly calling balls and strikes.  Pitchers are 
                                                     
8 MLB’s Executive Vice President for Baseball Operations Sandy Alderson, who issued the directive for closer rule-book 
enforcement of the strike zone, stated that he expected to see more strikes called: “I expect to see more consistency, and 
with that greater consistency I think you’ll see more strikes called. …That’s the direction we’re pushing the umpires” 
Chass (2001b). 
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expected to be more careful, and pitch on the fringes of the strike zone, when the platoon advantage is in 
effect.  
Figure 1. Called Strike Rate by Year (2000-2009) 
 
 
4. Impact of QuesTec Monitoring on the Play of the Game 
The reason MLB implemented monitoring was to affect the overall play of the game.  While the desired 
consequences of the League are unknown, at the time QuesTec was introduced, baseball was concerned 
about two particular issues affecting fan interest.  First, offense was at a historically high level, with home 
runs becoming especially more prevalent and noteworthy.  Roger Maris’s league-record 61 home runs had 
remained unbroken for 37 years before it was surpassed six times between 1998 and 2001.  MLB was facing 
scrutiny regarding performance-enhancing drugs as the chief contributor to the boost in offense during this 
era.  Mills (forthcoming b) demonstrates that strike zone manipulation after the QuesTec era by MLB was 
correlated with reductions in offense; perhaps, QuesTec was implemented with similar intentions.  Second, 
baseball games were also growing longer, and MLB openly discussed methods for shortening the games.  
More accurate umpiring to generate quicker outs may have been another goal.  
I estimate the effect of QuesTec on several performance areas using Equation 2.  Y is the total number of 
runs, home runs, strikeouts, or walks in the game (g), or total length of the game in minutes.  The vector 
variables are the same as those included in Equation 1, except they are aggregated at the game level.  In place 
of individual performance characteristics, I include overall average team performance in the same 
performance area as the dependent variable for the playing teams.  I also include the total number of outs in 
the game to control for game length.  I estimate Equation 2 using Ordinary Least Squares, and standard 
errors are clustered to individual umpires.  Table 2 reports the coefficient estimates, and summary statistics 
are available in Table A.2 in the appendix.  
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(2) Yg = μM g + β1Home Team Performanceg + β2Visiting Team Performanceg + β3Outsg + τTg + υUg + φBg 
+ α + εg 
Table 2. Effect of QuesTec on Play of Game 
 
None of the monitoring variables are associated with game-level performances.  Given the small estimated 
effects estimated in Table 1, this is not surprising.  However, the effect on the length of the game is 
statistically significant, and the effect is not trivial.  QuesTec was associated with reduction in game time of 
one minute and 23 seconds.  While this is small compared to the average length of MLB games during the 
sample period (174 minutes), it demonstrates that the pace of the game can be increased through monitoring.  
Using the average number of plate appearances per game during the sample (78.36), the total reduction in 
pitches was just over one pitch per game (-0.0163 * 78.36 = - 1.28).  The average number of pitches per game 
was approximately 301; thus, on average, each pitch reduction lowered the game length by approximately 35 
seconds.  The reduction in pitches explains only one-third of the reduction in game length directly.  The rest 
of the reduction may reflect monitoring effects that spillover on the other aspects of the game in QuesTec 
parks.  The act of increased monitoring in one area (strike zone enforcement) may have encouraged umpires 
to maintain the pace of the game in other areas (limiting the duration of common delays such as pitching 
changes, time-outs, warm-ups, etc.).  This response is akin to the “broken windows” effect of criminal 
enforcement, where an emphasis on enforcing low-level criminal violations reduces crime in other areas 
(Corman and Mocan 2005). 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion  
This paper uses baseball data to evaluate the effectiveness of monitoring to deter shirking in a principal-agent 
framework.  Umpire agent responsiveness to principal MLB oversight following the asymmetric introduction 
of monitoring technology indicates small changes in umpire behavior.  The estimates provide evidence that 
umpires were more likely to favor pitchers absent monitoring, as well as responding to fan preferences and 
player experience.  Overall, umpires appeared to be quite sensitive to League mandates to change the strike 
zone whether or not they were being surveilled by objective computer monitoring.  This responsiveness 
Runs Home Runs Stikeouts Walks Time of Game
QuesTec -0.1802954 -0.0489682 -0.0237386 -0.023212 -1.3759853
[0.1296994] [0.0509151] [0.1196751] [0.0849533] [0.5122588]**
PITCHf/x 0.1755923 0.0629618 0.1486324 0.0308878 0.9751861
[0.1294803] [0.0408866] [0.0995800] [0.0882538] [0.5238900]
Zone Evaluation -0.1587898 -0.0567999 0.0201309 -0.0208632 0.0604884
[0.1236161] [0.0396464] [0.0964337] [0.0903194] [0.5038562]
Attendance -0.0000047 0.0000012 0.0000242 -0.0000097 0.0001357
[0.0000040] [0.0000012] [0.0000025]** [0.0000021]** [0.0000165]**
Mean Home Team Performance 1.1745377 1.197726 1.0528676 0.9833334 4.6832674
[0.0674629]** [0.0581967]** [0.0415092]** [0.0544191]** [0.3003518]**
Mean Visiting Team Performance 0.8125342 0.9552287 0.8786769 0.8371833 4.8212822
[0.0642260]** [0.0527568]** [0.0411365]** [0.0417322]** [0.2965928]**
Outs 0.0232616 0.0113668 0.2631054 0.1476173 3.4050818
[0.0063422]** [0.0023247]** [0.0066727]** [0.0050507]** [0.0334740]**
R
2
0.06 0.07 0.21 0.12 0.45
Observations 24,156 24,156 24,156 24,156 24,156
** p <.01, * p<.05, standard errors clustered to individual umpires in brackets
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indicates that that existing monitoring which involved subjective human review and efficiency wages was 
sufficient to effect agent conformity to League. 
Umpires calling fewer strikes in QuesTec parks may reflect umpire shirking absent external monitoring.  
However, the fact that umpires were highly responsive to the League directive to increase called strikes in all 
parks indicates that shirking may not be the only explanation.  Frey (1993) posits that tighter monitoring can 
create distrust in principal-agent relationships and result in “crowding out” of the disciplinary effects of 
monitoring in response.  Falk and Kosfeld (2006) further demonstrates that imposing monitoring can create 
hidden costs through reduced performance in response to the perceived slight.  However, the monopsony 
status of MLB in hiring umpires and the high wages that MLB umpires receive gives umpires little bargaining 
power to shirk directly in response to what might be viewed as an act of distrust.9  At the time of the analysis, 
the annual salaries of MLB umpires ranged from $120,000 to $350,000, well above the salaries minor-league 
umpires of less than $20,000 per year (O’Connell 2007, MiLB 2017).  Cappelli and Chauvin (1991) 
demonstrate that the wage premium relative to alternate employment options is negatively related to shirking; 
thus, the fear of losing a highly-coveted position with a significant wage-premium likely encourages umpire 
conformity with MLB dictates.  While umpire punishment and replacement were rare during the timeframe of 
analysis, MLB had previously replaced umpires who had been uncooperative in a labor dispute (not due to 
performance).  A disobedient umpire would face significant financial penalties for shirking.  Thus, the overall 
incentive structure and the small reduction in called strikes in QuesTec parks, relative to the much larger 
increase across all parks (including the parks monitored by QuesTec) indicates that crowding out is an 
unlikely explanation for the differences in calls inside and outside of QuesTec parks.  
While the estimates identify real effects of external objective monitoring, the practical effects are quite small, 
especially in comparison to the observed changes in umpire behavior regarding strikeouts that occurred in 
monitored and unmonitored ballparks at a magnitude that was much greater than identified shirking.  Overall, 
QuesTec was not associated with changes in on-field performance, though it was associated with shorter 
game lengths.  In total, the findings indicate that despite the lack of technological oversight, MLB umpires 
correctly managed games in accordance with MLB’s directives.  Though umpires are rarely publicly 
disciplined or fired, they are responsive to League preferences.  The results mirror those of Weingast and 
Moran (1983) which notes that effective oversight is consistent with the absence of obvious monitoring by 
the principal.  Thus, the threat of termination from a high-compensation position by a monopsony employer 
was effective in deterring employee shirking prior to objective monitoring.   
QuesTec’s implementation also may have served a public relations purpose.  Automated monitoring provided 
a signal that the game was being called fairly—umpires were not manipulating calls to favor teams, players, or 
assist gamblers—which may have boosted consumer interest in MLB’s product.  QuesTec was introduced at 
a time when other leagues were also introducing technological review of officials.  In 1999, the National 
Football League instituted instant replay review—following a beleaguered experiment from 1986 to 1991—in 
an effort to reverse incorrect calls on the field that were obvious to the viewing audience.  In the 2000s, 
college football conferences began to implement replay review as well.  MLB would later institute limited 
replay review in 2008 before adopting a more comprehensive replay review system in 2014.  QuesTec was 
abandoned after 2008 and replaced universal ball/strike monitoring systems in all ballparks that are accessible 
by fans and have become regularly displayed during television broadcasts.  The use of this technology as an 
agent monitoring system by the principal has become secondary to the fan experience.    
                                                     
9 MLB umpires are represented by a union, but it would be incorrect to view this labor market as a bilateral monopoly 
similar to the relationship that MLB has with players’ union.  While MLB umpires may have exceptional skill, they are 
much more easily replaced than the players and thus have weak bargaining power.  A labor battle following the 1999 
season resulted in the replacement of 22 long-time umpires.  
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Analysis of more recent data in the Zone Evaluation era by Mills (forthcoming a) shows umpires have 
continued to improve the accuracy rates from 85 percent, at the conclusion of the QuesTec era in 2008, to 89 
percent by 2014.  Even with more advanced technology, the gains have been small.  Mills (forthcoming b) 
also demonstrates that league-mandated changes regarding the enforcement of the strike zone had a 
significant impact on offense.  This analysis shows that umpires were highly responsive to principal edicts, 
and thus offense changes could have been achieved through strike zone manipulation with pre-QuesTec 
oversight.  Improvement in pitching technology has likely aided umpires through self-evaluation and feedback 
that were not previously available, in addition to the threat of punishment for missing calls as objectively 
determined by computer monitoring.   
The overall response to League dictates, and the paltry estimates of shirking where monitoring was 
implemented, indicate that MLB’s monitoring strategy of human observation combined with relatively high 
compensation was sufficient to align agent behavior with principal goals.  Thus, additional monitoring may 
not necessarily improve performance in certain principal-agent relationships even when crowding out is an 
unlikely explanation. 
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Appendix 
Table. A.1. Summary Statistics, Play-By-Play Variables 
 
 
Table A.2. Summary Statistics, Game-Level Variables 
  
Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Called Strikes Per Pitches Thrown 1,323,427 0.3422318 0.3411171 0 1
Swings Per Pitches Thrown 1,606,351 0.5278087 0.2743856 0 1
Pitches Per Plate Appearance 1,606,351 3.730344 1.879353 1 18
QuesTec 1,606,351 0.2484258 0.4321001 0 1
PITCHf/x 1,606,351 0.244634 0.4298701 0 1
Zone Evaluation 1,606,351 0.0993108 0.299079 0 1
Home Team Batter 1,606,351 0.4912675 0.4999239 0 1
Attendance 1,606,351 30,505 11,369 2,134 61,707
Batter Called Strikes Rate 1,606,351 0.3709482 0.0329289 0.2365039 0.4814952
Pitcher Called Strike Rate 1,606,351 0.367597 0.0276025 0.2491103 0.4934579
Batter Swing Percentage 1,606,351 0.4508216 0.050161 0.2791075 0.6786633
Pitcher Swing Percentage 1,606,351 0.4522806 0.0284973 0.3271028 0.584344
Batter Pitches per Plate Appearance 1,606,351 1.72647 0.1393338 1.115073 2.273504
Pitcher Pitches per Batter Faced 1,606,351 2.108997 1.697285 0.1468599 15.24
Batter Experience 1,606,351 6.285266 4.201766 0 25.40178
Pitcher Experience 1,606,351 5.540736 4.413035 0 24.47912
Platoon 1,606,351 0.544231 0.4980399 0 1
Catcher Batting 1,606,351 0.1241827 0.32979 0 1
Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Runs Scored 24,156 9.513951 4.63529 1 36
Home Team Runs per Game 24,156 4.834299 0.6547064 3.345679 7.814815
Visiting Team Runs per Game 24,156 4.68368 0.5220422 3.395062 6.037037
Home Runs 24,156 2.147127 1.595547 0 12
Home Team Home Runs per Game 24,156 1.080429 0.2607399 0.5555556 1.888889
Visiting Team Home Runs per Game 24,156 1.066482 0.2007517 0.5679013 1.703704
Strikeouts 24,156 13.12328 4.071992 2 40
Home Team Strikeouts per Game 24,156 6.24371 0.7310756 4.493827 8.888889
Visiting Team Strikeouts per Game 24,156 6.877698 0.711014 5.15 9.074074
Walks 24,156 6.688939 3.106158 0 24
Home Team Walks per Game 24,156 3.402914 0.4752322 2.175 5.08642
Visiting Team Walks per Game 24,156 3.287262 0.4690266 2.2375 4.679012
Length of Game (minutes) 24,156 174.4818 26.45195 79 395
QuesTec 24,156 0.2472678 0.4314326 0 1
PITCHf/x 24,156 0.2462328 0.4308247 0 1
Zone Evaluation 24,156 0.1001408 0.3001938 0 1
Attendance 24,156 30,490 11,368 2,134 61,707
Outs 24156 53.48882 4.83664 27 132
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